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Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Games in Systems with
Bounded Control Inputs
Maojiao Ye
Abstract—Noticing that physical limitations are ubiquitous
in practical engineering systems, this paper considers Nash
equilibrium seeking for games in systems where the control
inputs are bounded. More specifically, first-order integrator-
type systems with bounded control inputs are firstly considered
and two saturated control strategies are designed to seek for
the Nash equilibrium of the game. Then, we further consider
the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for games in second-
order integrator-type systems. As this problem has rarely been
investigated, we firstly propose a centralized seeking strategy
without considering the boundedness of the control inputs,
followed by a distributed counterpart. By further adapting a
saturation function into the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy,
a new seeking strategy is then designed for the considered
second-order systems with bounded controls. In the proposed
distributed strategies, consensus protocols are included for
information sharing and the saturation functions are utilized
to construct bounded control inputs. The convergence results
are established through conducting Lyapunov stability analysis.
Lastly, by considering the connectivity control of mobile sensor
networks, the proposed methods are numerically verified.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium seeking; bounded con-
trol inputs; first-order integrator-type systems; second-order
integrator-type systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Games are attracting growing interests from researchers
in the multi-agent communities for the analysis of multi-
agent systems in recent years [1]. For example, consensus
was accomplished by utilizing cooperative game theory in
[2]. Differential games were applied to solve distributed
optimal tracking control of multi-agent systems with external
disturbance in [3]. The works in [4]-[6] linked games to
cooperative control and optimization of multi-agent systems,
respectively. In [7], the consensus analysis for a class of
hybrid multi-agent systems was conducted based on a non-
cooperative game. These works motivate the consideration
of the physical constraints in multi-agent systems for Nash
equilibrium seeking problems. The concerned constraints in-
clude but are not limited to communication issues among the
agents, input saturation and system dynamics. Recent years
witnessed the efforts made by researchers to accommodate
the communication issues for games in distributed networks
(see, e.g., [25]). However, actuator limitations and system
dynamics have rarely been investigated.
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As many engineering systems are subject to actuator
limitations (e.g., robotic manipulators [8], spacecraft [9],
hard disk drive servo systems [10], just to name a few),
the boundedness of control inputs appears to be a problem
that is both practically and theoretically concerned. The
study for systems with bounded control inputs has a rich
history. For example, input-saturated linear systems were
considered in [11] based on an anti-windup design. Back-
stepping approaches were employed for developing robust
adaptive control strategies to accommodate uncertain non-
linear systems subject to input saturation [12]. Two-player
zero-sum games with non-quadratic payoffs were employed
to solve the H∞ control of systems with bounded control
inputs in [13]. Moreover, with the development of multi-
agent systems, consensus of input-saturated multi-agent sys-
tems has attracted a lot of attention. The authors in [14]
dealt with leader-following consensus of linear multi-agent
systems with input saturation. Global consensus of saturated
discrete-time systems was addressed in [15]. Optimal con-
sensus for multi-agent systems with bounded control inputs
was investigated in [16]-[17]. However, games in systems
with bounded controls still remain to be solved. Moreover,
most of the existing Nash equilibrium seeking strategies
are designed for games in quasi-static systems or systems
with first-order integrator-type dynamics. Velocity-actuated
vehicles are typical examples that are of first-order integrator-
type dynamics. However, acceleration-actuated vehicles are
second-order integrator-type systems that are beyond the
scope of first-order integrator-type systems.
Inspired by the above observations, we intend to design
Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for games in both first-
order and second-order integrator-type systems in which the
controls are bounded. The considered problem is challenging
as the saturation function would introduce high nonlin-
earity into the closed-loop system. Moreover, the analysis
of second-order systems is more complex compared with
the first-order systems studied by the existing literature.
In summary, compared with the existing works, this paper
contributes in the following aspects:
1) Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in
systems with bounded control inputs is considered
in this paper. First-order integrator-type systems are
firstly considered, in which both the saturated gradient
play and a distributed strategy are investigated. Then,
second-order integrator-type systems are explored. A
centralized algorithm is firstly proposed without con-
sidering the boundedness of the control inputs, fol-
lowed by two distributed seeking schemes.
2) The convergence results of the proposed Nash equilib-
rium seeking strategies are analytically investigated. It
is proven that the proposed seeking strategies would
enable the players’ actions to asymptotically converge
to the Nash equilibrium under the given conditions.
Related works: Nash equilibrium seeking is in the spot-
light of research in recent years. For example, extremum
seeking based approaches (e.g., [18]-[19]) were designed
for games in which the explicit model information is not
available for the players. Gossip-based algorithms (see, e.g.,
[20]-[21]) and consensus-based algorithms (see, e.g., [23]-
[27]) were developed by adopting gossip and consensus pro-
tocols for information broadcasting in distributed networks,
respectively. Stochastic gradient strategies were designed in
[28] for games subject to unknown statistical distribution
and a payoff-based algorithm was proposed in [29] under
a stochastic environment. A forward-backward-forward al-
gorithm was proposed in [30] to solve convex aggregative
games in a semi-decentralized environment. Two gradient-
based algorithms were proposed in [22].
This paper follows our previous works to establish the
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies based on
consensus protocols. The consensus-based Nash equilibrium
seeking strategy was proposed in [23]-[24]. Switching com-
munication topologies and weight-balanced digraphs were
accommodated in [25] and [32], respectively. In [26], the
proposed seeking strategies were adapted for hybrid games.
Moreover, nonlinear inequality constraints were further tack-
led in [31] by adapting the consensus-based algorithms.
The idea of achieving distributed Nash equilibrium seeking
was further adapted for N-coalition noncooperative games in
[27]. However, these works are on first-order integrator-type
systems without constraints on the control inputs. Compared
with the aforementioned works, we consider systems with
bounded control inputs in this paper. Moreover, games in
second-order integrator-type systems are also investigated.
Hence, the developed methods broaden the applicable fields
for the previously studied consensus-based Nash equilibrium
seeking strategies.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. The problem
formulation is shown in Section II. Section III presents the
main results, in which games in the first-order integrator-type
systems and second-order integrator-type systems are suc-
cessively considered. In Section IV, we apply the proposed
methods to achieve the connectivity control of a network of
sensor networks to numerically verify the effectiveness of
the proposed methods. Lastly, in Section V, we conclude the
paper.
Notations: In the rest of the paper, we use R to denote
the set of real numbers. The notation [hi]vec is defined
as [hi]vec = [h1, h2, · · · , hN ]T and diag{hij}(diag{hi})
for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are h11, h12, · · · , h1N , h21, · · · , hNN ,
(h1, h2, · · · , hN ), successively. For Q ∈ RN×N , λmin(Q)
denotes the minimum eigenvalue of Q. Moreover, ⊗ is the
Kronecker product. The notation min{a, b} = a if a ≤ b
and min{a, b} = b if a > b. In addition, the graph related
definitions follow those in [24] and are omitted directly in
this context.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a game with N players whose dynamics are
governed by
xni = ui, (1)
where xi ∈ R is the action of player i and ui ∈ R
is the control input that satisfies |ui| ≤ U¯ . Moreover,
xni denotes the nth-order time derivative of xi and in the
subsequent section, n = 1 and n = 2 will be investigated
successively. Let fi(x), where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]T , be
the cost function of player i and {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the
set of N players. Given that the Nash equilibrium of the
game exits, this paper aims to design the bounded controls
to seek for the Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i) on which
fi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ fi(xi,x∗−i), (2)
for xi ∈ R, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and x−i =
[x1, x2, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ]T under the following con-
ditions.
Assumption 1: The players’ cost functions are C2 func-
tions. Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, ∂fi(x)
∂xi
is
globally Lipschitz for x ∈ RN .
Assumption 2: The players are equipped with a commu-
nication graph G, which is undirected and connected.
Assumption 3: [24][27] There exists a positive constantm
such that
(x− z)T (P¯(x)− P¯(z)) ≥ m||x− z||2, (3)
for all x, z ∈ RN . Note that in (3), P¯(x) =[
∂f1(x)
∂x1
,
∂f2(x)
∂x2
, · · · , ∂fN (x)
∂xN
]T
.
Remark 1: Let gi(x) =
∂fi(x)
∂xi
, then,
gi(x1, x2, · · · , xN )− gi(z1, z2, · · · , zN )
=gi(x1, x2, · · · , xN )− gi(z1, x2, · · · , xN )
+ gi(z1, x2, · · · , xN )− gi(z1, z2, · · · , xN )
+ · · ·
+ gi(z1, z2, · · · , zN−1, xN )− gi(z1, z2, · · · , zN ).
(4)
By the mean value theorem,
gi(x1, x2, · · · , xN )− gi(z1, z2, · · · , zN)
=
∂gi
∂x1
(s¯1, x2, · · · , xN )(x1 − z1)
+
∂gi
∂x2
(z1, s¯2, · · · , xN )(x2 − z2)
+ · · ·
+
∂gi
∂xN
(z1, z2, · · · , zN−1, s¯N )(xN − zN),
(5)
where s¯i ∈ [xi, zi] for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Hence,
(x− z)T (P¯(x) − P¯(z)) = (x− z)TH1(s)(x− z), (6)
where H1(s) is defined as a matrix in which the el-
ement on the ith row and jth column is hij(sij) =
∂2fi
∂xi∂xj
(z1, z2, · · · , zj−1, s¯j , xj+1, · · · , xN ). Hence, (3) is
satisfied if and only if there exists a positive constant m
such that H1(s) + H
T
1 (s) ≥ 2mI . Consider a special case
in which xi = zi = s¯i, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, then,
HT (x) +H(x) ≥ 2mI, (7)
for x ∈ RN , where
H(x) =


∂f21 (x)
∂x21
∂f21 (x)
∂x1∂x2
· · · ∂f21 (x)
∂x1∂xN
∂f22 (x)
∂x2∂x1
∂f22 (x)
∂x22
· · · ∂f22 (x)
∂x2∂xN
...
. . .
...
∂f2N (x)
∂xN∂x1
∂f2N (x)
∂xN∂x2
· · · ∂f2N (x)
∂x2
N

 . (8)
Assumption 4: The elements inH(x) are bounded for x ∈
R
N .
Remark 2: The global Lipschitz of
∂fi(x)
∂xi
for i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} (in Assumption 3) and Assumption 4 are
utilized for the development of global convergence results,
and without these conditions, weaker convergence results can
be obtained.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In the following, Nash equilibrium seeking for games in
which the players are of first-order integrator-type dynamics
and second-order integrator-type dynamics will be succes-
sively investigated.
A. First-order integrator-type systems
In this section, we consider games in which the players’
actions are governed by
x˙i = ui, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. (9)
In the subsequent sections, saturated gradient play will be
firstly considered, followed by a distributed seeking strategy.
1) Saturated gradient play: To seek for the Nash equilib-
rium of the game, we suppose that the players update their
actions according to the saturated gradient play given by
x˙i = −ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)
, (10)
where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, and ρU¯ (ηi) =
sgn(ηi)min{|ηi|, U¯}.
Theorem 1: The Nash equilibrium of the game is globally
asymptotically stable under (10) given that Assumptions 1
and 3 are satisfied.
Proof: Let
V
(P¯(x)) = N∑
i=1
∫ ∂fi(x)
∂xi
0
ρU¯ (t)dt, (11)
be the Lyapunov candidate function. Then, it can be easily
verified that the Lyapunov candidate function is positive
definite and radially unbounded.
Moreover,
V˙ =
N∑
i=1
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)(
∂
∂x
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
))T
x˙
=−
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
H(x)
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
.
(12)
By Assumption 3, HT (x) +H(x) ≥ 2mI . Therefore,
V˙ ≤ −m
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
. (13)
Hence,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρU¯ (∂fi(x)∂xi
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ → 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
which indicates that ||x− x∗|| → 0 as t→ 0. 
Remark 3: Note that the global Lipschitz condition in As-
sumption 1 is not required to establish the convergence result
in Theorem 1, though we directly suppose that Assumption
1 is satisfied in the statement of Theorem 1 for convenience.
In Theorem 1, the convergence property of the saturated
gradient play in (10) is investigated. In the following, we
investigate the problem in distributed networks.
2) Consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium seeking:
To achieve Nash equilibrium seeking in distributed networks,
we suppose that the players can communicate with each
other via a local communication graph G. Then, the Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy can be designed as
x˙i =− ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)
,
y˙ij =− θij
(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − xj)
)
,
(14)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and θij = θθ¯ij , where θ is a
positive parameter to be determined and θ¯ij is a fixed
positive constant for each i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Moreover,
yi = [yi1, yi2, · · · , yiN ]T stands for player i’s local estimate
on x and ∂fi
∂xi
(yi) is defined as
∂fi
∂xi
(yi) =
∂fi(x)
∂xi
|x=yi .
Furthermore, aij is the element on the ith row and jth
column of the adjacency matrix of the communication graph
G.
Then, the concatenated-vector form of (14) is
x˙ =−
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
y˙ =− θΘ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ x),
(15)
where y = [yij ]vec, Θ¯ = diag{θ¯ij}, L is the Laplacian
matrix of G, A = diag{aij} and IN×N is an N × N
dimensional identity matrix.
Remark 4: The seeking strategy in (14) is adapted from
the seeking strategy in [24] in which the saturation function
is included to ensure that |ui| ≤ U¯ .
The following is a supportive lemma for further facilitation
of the closed-loop system analysis in (14).
Lemma 1: For all η1, η2 ∈ R,
|ρU¯ (η1)− ρU¯ (η2)| ≤ |η1 − η2|. (16)
Proof: Noticing that |ρU¯ (η1) − ρU¯ (η2)| can be regarded as
the distance between ρU¯ (η1) and ρU¯ (η2) and |η1 − η2| is
the distance between η1 and η2, the conclusion can be easily
derived. 
The following theorem establishes the stability result for
the seeking strategy in (14).
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied,
and the players update their actions according to (14). Then,
there exists a θ∗ such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), the Nash
equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V =
N∑
i=1
∫ ∂fi(x)
∂xi
0
ρU¯ (t)dt+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y− 1N ⊗ x)
(17)
where P is a symmetric positive definite matrix that satisfies
[23]
PΘ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A) + (L ⊗ IN×N +A)Θ¯P = Q (18)
where Q is a symmetric positive definite matrix.
Then,
V˙ =−
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
H(x)
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
+ (y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)TP(y − 1N ⊗ x)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ x)TP(y˙ − 1N ⊗ x˙)
≤−
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
H(x)
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
+ 2(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP
(
1N ⊗
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
)
− λmin(Q)θ||y − 1N ⊗ x||2.
(19)
Therefore,
V˙ ≤−
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
H(x)
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
− λmin(Q)θ||y − 1N ⊗ x||2
+
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
H(x)×[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)
− ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
+ 2(y − 1N ⊗ x)TP1N ⊗
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)]
vec
.
(20)
By Lemma 1 and Assumption 1,∣∣∣∣ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)
− ρU¯
(
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
)∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∂fi(x)∂xi −
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
∣∣∣∣
≤l¯i||x− yi||,
(21)
for some positive constant l¯i.
Hence, there are positive constants l1, l2, l3 such that
V˙ ≤−m
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
− λmin(Q)θ||y − 1N ⊗ x||2
+ l1
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ||y − 1N ⊗ x||
+ l2||y − 1N ⊗ x||2
+ l3||y − 1N ⊗ x||
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ,
(22)
by further noticing that the elements in H(x) are bounded
according to Assumption 4.
Therefore,
V˙ ≤−
(
m− l1
2ǫ1
− l3
2ǫ2
) ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
−
(
λmin(Q)θ − l2 − l1ǫ1
2
− l3ǫ2
2
)
||y − 1N ⊗ x||2
(23)
in which ǫ1, ǫ2 are positive constants that can be arbitrarily
chosen. Choose ǫ1, ǫ2 such that m− l12ǫ1 − l32ǫ2 > 0 and for
fixed ǫ1, ǫ2, choose θ such that λmin(Q)θ−l2− l1ǫ12 − l3ǫ22 >
0. If this is the case, there exists a positive constant l4 such
that
V˙ ≤ −l4||χ||2, (24)
where χ =
[[
ρU¯
(
∂fi(x)
∂xi
)]T
vec
, (y − 1N ⊗ x)T
]T
. By fur-
ther noticing that V is positive definite and radially un-
bounded, we can conclude that ||χ|| → 0 as t→∞, which
indicates that y → 1N ⊗ x → 1N ⊗ x∗ as t → ∞. To this
end, we arrive at the conclusion. 
B. Second-order integrator-type systems
In this section, we consider Nash equilibrium seeking
for games in second-order integrator-type systems in which
player i’s action is governed by
x˙i = νi
ν˙i = ui,
(25)
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. More specifically, in Section III-B.1,
a centralized algorithm will be proposed without considering
the boundedness of the control inputs. Moreover, the prob-
lem is reconsidered under distributed networks in Section
III-B.2. Lastly, the boundedness of the control inputs will be
addressed in Section III-B.3.
1) Centralized Nash equilibrium seeking without consid-
ering the boundedness of the control inputs: Let the Nash
equilibrium seeking strategy be
x˙ = ν
ν˙ = −βν − α
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
−H(x)ν , (26)
where ν = [νi]vec and α, β are positive control gains to be
determined.
Then, the following result can be obtained.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1, 3 are satisfied
and the players update their actions according to (26). Then,
there exists a positive constant α∗ such that for each α ∈
(0, α∗), there exists a positive constant β∗(α) such that
for each β ∈ (0, β∗), the Nash equilibrium is globally
asymptotically stable under (26).
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V = νTν +
1
2
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]T
vec
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
+ νT
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
.
(27)
Then,
V =
1
6
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
+
1
4
||ν||2
+
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√3
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
+
√
3
2
ν
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
(28)
and it can be easily concluded that the Lyapunov candidate
function is positive definite and radially unbounded. More-
over,
V˙ =2νT
(
−βν − α
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
−H(x)ν
)
+
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]T
vec
H(x)ν + νTH(x)ν
+
(
−βν − α
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
−H(x)ν
)T [
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
≤− (2β +m)||ν||2 − α
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
+ (2α+ β)||ν||
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
≤−
(
2β +m− 2α+ β
2ǫ1
)
||ν||2
−
(
α− ǫ1(2α+ β)
2
) ∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
[
∂fi(x)
∂xi
]
vec
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
,
(29)
where ǫ1 is a positive constant that can be arbitrarily chosen.
Let
2α+ β
2(2β +m)
< ǫ1 <
2α
2α+ β
2α− 2√αm < β < 2α+ 2√αm.
(30)
Then, V˙ is negative definite. Hence, the conclusion can be
drawn with α∗ = m and β∗ = 2α+ 2
√
αm. 
Remark 5: Note that similar to Theorem 1, the global
Lipschitz condition in Assumption 1 is not required in the
development of Theorem 3, though we directly suppose that
Assumption 1 is satisfied for statement convenience.
The seeking strategy in (26) achieves the Nash equilib-
rium seeking in a centralized fashion. In the following, we
consider Nash equilibrium seeking in distributed networks.
2) Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking without consid-
ering the boundedness of control inputs: Suppose that in the
considered game, each player i, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} updates
their own action according to
x˙i = νi
ν˙i = −(xi − νi)− (νi − z˙i)
z˙i = −K¯i ∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
y˙ij = −θij(
N∑
k=1
aik(yij − ykj) + aij(yij − zi)),
(31)
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and zi, yij are auxiliary variables.
Moreover, K¯i = θ1Ki, θij = θθ1θ¯ij in which θ, θ1 are
positive parameters to be determined and Ki, θ¯ij are fixed
positive constants.
The concatenated vector form of (31) is
x˙ = ν
ν˙ = −(x− z)− (ν − z˙)
z˙ = −K¯
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
y˙ = −Θ(L⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ z),
(32)
where K¯ = diag{K¯i},Θ = diag{θij} and z = [zi]vec.
The following theorem establishes the stability of the
equilibrium in (32).
Theorem 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied
and the players update their actions according to (32). Then,
there exists a positive constant θ∗ such that for each θ ∈
(θ∗,∞), there exists a positive constant θ∗1(θ) such that
for each θ1 ∈ (0, θ∗1), the Nash equilibrium is globally
asymptotically stable.
Proof: Consider
V (η) =
1
2
(z − x∗)TK−1(z − x∗)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ z)TP(y − 1N ⊗ z)
+
1
2
(x− z)T (x− z) + 1
2
(ν − z˙)T (ν − z˙),
(33)
where P is defined in the proof of Theorem 2, η = [(z −
x∗)T , (y−1N⊗z)T , (x−z)T , (ν−z˙)T ]T andK = diag{Ki}
as the Lyapunov candidate function. Then,
V˙ ≤− θ1(z− x∗)T
[
∂fi
∂xi
(z)
]
vec
− λmin(Q)θθ1||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
− ||ν − z˙||2 + θ1(z − x∗)T
[
∂fi
∂xi
(z) − ∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
− 2(y − 1N ⊗ z)TP1N ⊗ z˙− (ν − z˙)T z¨.
(34)
By Assumption 3,
− (z− x∗)T
[
∂fi
∂xi
(z)
]
vec
≤ −m||z− x∗||2. (35)
Moreover, by Assumption 1, there exist positive constants
l¯i1, l¯i2 such that∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ∂fi∂xi (z)−
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ≤ l¯i1||y − 1N ⊗ z||, (36)
and∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ∂fi∂xi (yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ ∂fi∂xi (yi)−
∂fi
∂xi
(z) +
∂fi
∂xi
(z) − ∂fi
∂xi
(x∗)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
≤l¯i2||yi − z||+ l¯i2||z− x∗||.
(37)
In addition,
z¨ = −θθ21KH¯(y)Θ¯(L ⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ z), (38)
where H¯(y) =


h¯11 h¯12 · · · h¯1N
h¯21 h¯22 · · · h¯2N
...
. . .
h¯N1 h¯N2 · · · h¯NN

 and h¯ij ∈
R
1×N . Moreover, h¯ij = 0
T
N for i 6= j and
h¯ii =
[
∂2fi
∂xi∂x1
(yi),
∂2fi
∂xi∂x2
(yi), · · · , ∂
2fi
∂xi∂xN
(yi)
]
. By fur-
ther noticing that H¯(y) is bounded according to Assumption
4, there exist positive constants l1, l2, l3 and l4 such that
V˙ ≤− θ1m||z− x∗||2 − λmin(Q)θθ1||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
− ||ν − z˙||2 + θ1l1||z− x∗||||y − 1N ⊗ z||
+ θ1l2||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
+ θ1l3||z− x∗||||y − 1N ⊗ z||
+ θθ21l4||ν − z˙||||y − 1N ⊗ z||.
(39)
Define A1 =
[
m − l1+l32
− l1+l32 λmin(Q)θ − l2
]
, and choose θ >
(l1+l3)
2
4mλmin(Q)
+ l2
λmin(Q)
, then,
V˙ ≤− θ1λmin(A1)||E1||2 − ||ν − z˙||2
+ θθ21l4||ν − z˙||||y − 1N ⊗ z||,
(40)
where λmin(A1) > 0 and E1 = [(z−x∗)T , (y−1N⊗z)T ]T .
Moreover, define A2 =
[
θ1λmin(A1) − θθ
2
1l4
2
− θθ21l42 1
]
. Then,
λmin(A2) > 0 given that θ1 <
(
4λmin(A1)
θ2l24
) 1
3
. If this is the
case,
V˙ ≤ −λmin(A2)||E||2, (41)
where E = [(z − x∗)T , (y − 1N ⊗ z)T , (ν − z˙)T ]T . If this
is the case, we have z = x∗,y = 1N ⊗ z,ν = z˙ at V˙ = 0,
which indicates that
x˙ = ν
ν˙ = −(x− z)
z˙ = 0N
y˙ = 0N2 .
(42)
Recalling that ν = z˙ at V˙ = 0, we have ν = 0. Hence,
x˙ = 0 and x = C1, z = C2 at V˙ = 0, where C1, C2 are
constant vectors. Therefore,
ν˙ = −C1 + C2 (43)
at V˙ = 0. Recalling that ν = 0, we can get that C1 = C2,
i.e., x = z. Hence, V˙ is negative definite under the given
conditions and the conclusion can be derived by utilizing the
LaSalle Invariant Principle. 
The strategy in (32) addressed the Nash equilibrium
seeking problem for games in second-order integrator-type
systems without considering the boundedness of the controls.
In the upcoming section, the seeking strategy in (32) will be
adapted for systems where the controls are bounded.
3) Distributed Nash equilibrium with bounded control
inputs: Let the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy be
x˙ = ν
ν˙ = −ρU¯ ((x − z) + (ν − z˙))
z˙ = −K¯
[
∂fi
∂xi
(yi)
]
vec
y˙ = −Θ(L⊗ IN×N +A)(y − 1N ⊗ z).
(44)
Then, the following result can be derived.
Theorem 5: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
Then, for any positive constant ∆, there exists a positive
constant θ∗ such that for each θ ∈ (θ∗,∞), there ex-
ists a positive constant θ∗1(∆, θ) such that for each θ1 ∈
(0, θ∗1), x generated by (44) converges asymptotically to x
∗
given that ||(ν(0) − z˙(0))T , (x(0) − z(0))T , (y(0) − 1N ⊗
z(0))T , (z(0)− x∗)T || ≤ ∆.
Proof: Define the Lyapunov candidate function as
V (η) =
1
2
(z− x∗)TK−1(z− x∗)
+ (y − 1N ⊗ z)TP(y − 1N ⊗ z)
+
N∑
i=1
∫ xi−zi
0
ρU¯ (t)dt +
N∑
i=1
∫ xi−zi+vi−z˙i
0
ρU¯ (t)dt
+ (ν − z˙)T (ν − z˙),
(45)
where P is defined in the proof of Theorem 1 and η =
[(z − x∗)T , (y − 1N ⊗ z)T , (x − z)T , (ν − z˙)T ]T . Then, it
can be easily derived that the Lyapunov candidate function is
positive definite and radially unbounded. Moreover, follow-
ing the analysis in the proof of Theorem 4, it can be derived
that there are positive constants l1, l2 such that
V˙ ≤− θ1m||z− x∗||2 − λmin(Q)θθ1||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
+ θ1l1||z− x∗||||y − 1N ⊗ z||+ θ1l2||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
+ ρU¯ (x− z)T (ν − z˙)− 2(ν − z˙)T ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − ν˙)
− 2(ν − z˙)T z¨+ ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)T (ν − z˙)
− ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)T ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)
− ρU¯ (z − z+ ν − z˙)T z¨.
(46)
Since
− (ν − z˙)T (ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)− ρU¯ (x− z)) ≤ 0, (47)
we have
V˙ ≤− θ1m||z− x∗||2 − λmin(Q)θθ1||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
+ θ1l1||z− x∗||||y − 1N ⊗ z||+ θ1l2||y − 1N ⊗ z||2
− ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)TρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)
− ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)T z¨− 2(ν − z˙)T z¨.
(48)
By further following the proof of Theorem 4, we can
conclude that by choosing θ >
4mλmin(Q)
l21+4ml2
, there exist
positive constants l4, l5 such that
V˙ ≤− θ1λmin(A1)||E1||2
− ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)TρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)
+ l4θθ
2
1||ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙)||||y − 1N ⊗ z||
+ l5θθ
2
1||ν − z˙||||y − 1N ⊗ z||,
(49)
where A1 =
[
m − l12
− l12 λmin(Q)θ − l2
]
, E1 = [(z −
x∗)T , (y−1N ⊗z)T ]T and l4, l5 are positive constants such
that
||ρU¯ (x−z+ν−z˙)z¨|| ≤ l4θθ21||ρU¯ (x−z+ν−z˙)||||y−1N⊗z||,
(50)
and
||2(ν − z˙)z¨|| ≤ l5θθ21||ν − z˙||||y − 1N ⊗ z||. (51)
To facilitate the subsequent analysis, define
W (η) =λmin(A1)||E1||2
+ ρU¯ (x − z+ ν − z˙)T ρU¯ (x− z+ ν − z˙).
(52)
Then,W (η) ≥ 0. Moreover,W (η) = 0 if and only ||E1|| =
0 and ||ρU¯ (x − z + ν − z˙)|| = 0. By further noticing that
(44) is satisfied, we have
ν˙ = 0
y˙ = 0
z˙ = 0,
(53)
at W (η) = 0. If this is the case, ν = C1, where C1 is a
positive constant vector. Moreover, for W (η) = 0,
x = x∗ − C1
x˙ = C1,
(54)
by which we can derive that C1 = 0 and x = x
∗. Hence,
W (η) = 0 if and only if ||η|| = 0. Therefore, W (η) is
positive define and there exists a class K function γ such
that
γ(||η||) ≤W (η). (55)
Hence,
V˙ ≤− θ1γ(||η||) + l5θθ21||ν − z˙||||y − 1N ⊗ z||
+ l4θθ
2
1||ρU¯ (x − z+ ν − z˙)||||y − 1N ⊗ z||,
(56)
given that θ1 < 1.
Therefore, for η that belongs to any compact set that
contains the origin, there exists a positive constant l6 such
that
V˙ ≤ −θ1γ(||η||) + θθ21l6, (57)
which indicates that
V˙ ≤ −θ1
2
γ(||η||), ∀||η|| ≥ γ−1(2θθ1l6). (58)
Recalling that V is positive definite, there exist γ1, γ2 ∈ K
such that
γ1(||η||) ≤ V (η) ≤ γ2(||η||). (59)
Therefore, there exists a positive constant T1 such that
||η|| ≤ γ−11 (γ2(γ−1(2θθ1l6))) for all t ≥ T1. Choosing θ1 to
be sufficiently small such that γ−11 (γ2(γ
−1(2θθ1l6))) < U¯ .
Then, for t ≥ T1, the system in (44) is reduced to the system
in (32). Following the result in Theorem 3, the conclusion
can be derived. 
Remark 6: The theoretical results presented in this section
are established for xi ∈ R. However, they can be easily
extended to the case in which xi ∈ Rp and p ≥ 2 is a
positive integer.
IV. SIMULATION STUDIES: CONNECTIVITY CONTROL OF
MOBILE SENSOR NETWORKS
This section verifies the effectiveness of the proposed
seeking strategies in a mobile sensor network in which
xi ∈ R2 (denoted as xi1 and xi2, respectively). To highlight
the applications of the proposed methods, we consider the
connectivity control for a network of 3 mobile sensors in
which the sensors’ objective functions are given by [19]
fi(xi,x−i) = x
T
i riixi + x
T
i pi + qi +
∑
j∈Ni
mij ||xi − xj ||2,
(60)
where rii ∈ R2×2, pi ∈ R2×1, qi ∈ R,mij ∈ R are
constant matrices, vectors or parameters and Ni denotes the
neighboring set of player i. In the subsequent simulations,
we consider Example 1 of [19] in which i = 3, rii for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are identity matrices, and mij = 1 except
that m13 = m31 = 0. Moreover, p1 = [2,−2], p2 =
[−2,−2], p3 = [−4, 2], qi = 3 for i ∈ {1, 2} and q3 = 6.
In addition, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium at
x∗ = [−0.125, 0.75, 0.75, 0.5, 1.375,−0.25]T [19].
In the following, velocity-actuated vehicles and force-
actuated vehicles will be simulated, successively.
A. Velocity-actuated vehicles
In this section, we consider velocity-actuated vehicles,
whose dynamics can be described as
x˙i = ui, (61)
where xi = [xi1, xi2]
T denotes the position of sensor i, ui =
[ui1, ui2]
T ∈ R2, uij for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2} denotes the
velocity of sensor i and satisfies |uij | ≤ U¯ . The saturated
gradient play given in (10) and the distributed method shown
in (14) will be verified, successively.
1) Saturated gradient play: In this section, we suppose
that the mobile sensors can communicate with each other
via the communication graph depicted in Fig. 1 (a).
1 2 3
澻濴澼
1 3 2
澻濵澼
Fig. 1: The communication graph among the sensors.
Moreover, we suppose that the sensors update their actions
according to the saturated gradient play given in (10). With
x(0) = [10, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0]T and U¯ = 5, the trajectories of
the sensors’ positions generated by the saturated gradient
play are depicted in Fig. 2. The figure shows that the
sensors’ positions would converge to the Nash equilibrium
of the game asymptotically. Moreover, the control inputs
are illustrated in Fig. 3, from which we can see that the
control inputs are bounded by the given value. Hence, by
the presented results, Theorem 1 is numerically verified.
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Fig. 2: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions generated
by the saturated gradient play in (10).
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Fig. 3: The control inputs generated by the saturated gradient
play in (10).
2) Consensus-based distributed Nash equilibrium: In
Section IV-A.1, the physical interactions among the sensors’
objective functions coincide with their interactions in the
communication graph. However, if this is not the case, the
saturated gradient play can not be directly utilized in the
distributed sensor networks. As an alternative, the distributed
seeking strategy given in (14) can be adopted. To highlight
this case, suppose that the sensors can communicate with
each other via the communication graph depicted in Fig. 1
(b) in this section.
Let x(0) = [10, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0]T , U¯ = 5, and yij(0) =
10. Driven by the method in (14), the trajectories of the
sensors’ positions are plotted in Fig. 4 and the control
inputs are illustrated in Fig. 5. Fig. 4 demonstrates that the
trajectories of the sensors’ positions would converge to the
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the control inputs stay in the
bounded region as shown in Fig. 5. The simulation results
verify the theoretical result in Theorem 2.
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Fig. 4: The trajectories of the players’ actions generated by
the saturated gradient play in (14).
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Fig. 5: The control inputs generated by the saturated gradient
play in (14).
B. Force-actuated vehicles
In this section, we suppose that the agents are force-
actuated vehicles whose dynamics can be described by
x˙i = νi
ν˙i = ui,
(62)
where xi = [xi1, xi2]
T ∈ R2 is vector containing the
positions of sensor i, νi = [νi1, νi2]
T ∈ R2 is the vector
containing the velocities of sensor i and ui = [ui1, ui2]
T ∈
R
2 is the vector containing the control inputs that satisfy
|uij | ≤ U¯ , for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, j ∈ {1, 2}.
1) Centralized Nash equilibrium seeking: In this section,
we suppose that the sensors adopt the proposed strategy
in (26) to update their positions and all the variables in
(26) are initialized at zero. By setting α = 1, β = 1, the
trajectories of the sensors’ positions are depicted in Fig.
6. From the figure, we can see that the trajectories of the
sensors’ positions would converge to the Nash equilibrium
of the game. Moreover, the plots of the sensors’ velocities
are given in Fig. 7, which demonstrates that the sensors’
velocities converge to zero as their positions converge to the
Nash equilibrium. The simulation results are in line with the
theoretical results in Theorem 3.
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Fig. 6: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions generated
by (26).
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Fig. 7: The trajectories of the sensors’ velocities generated
by (26).
2) Distributed Nash equilibrium without input satura-
tion: In this section, we suppose that the sensors up-
date their actions according to (32). Moreover, z(0) =
[−10, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0]T and all the other variables are initialized
at zero. Under the communication graph depicted in Fig. 1
(b), the simulation results generated by the method in (32)
are shown in Figs. 8-9. Fig. 8 depicts the trajectories of the
sensors’ positions and Fig. 9 shows the trajectories of the
sensors’ velocities. From these figures, we can see that the
sensors’ positions converge to the Nash equilibrium of the
game, which numerically verifies the theoretical results in
Theorem 4.
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Fig. 8: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions generated
by (32).
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Fig. 9: The trajectories of the sensors’ velocities generated
by (32).
3) Distributed Nash equilibrium with bounded control
inputs: In this section, we suppose that the sensors update
their positions according to (44), in which U¯ = 5 and the
other variables are the same as those in Section IV-B.2.
Under the communication graph depicted in Fig. 1 (b), the
simulation results are given in Figs. 10-12. Fig. 10 depicts
the trajectories of the sensors’ positions, which shows that
the sensors’ positions asymptotically converge to the Nash
equilibrium of the game. Fig. 11 demonstrates that the
velocities converge to zero as the sensors’ positions converge
to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, as plotted in Fig. 12,
the control inputs are bounded by the given value. The
simulation results are in line with the theoretical results in
Theorem 5.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers Nash equilibrium seeking for games
in systems where the control inputs are bounded. More
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Fig. 10: The trajectories of the sensors’ positions generated
by (44).
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Fig. 11: The trajectories of the sensors’ velocities generated
by (44).
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Fig. 12: The control inputs generated by (44).
specifically, first-order integrator-type systems are firstly
considered, followed by second-order integrator-type sys-
tems. For both situations, we firstly design a centralized
seeking strategy based on the gradient play, which is further
adapted to distributed networks. Based on the Lyapunov
stability analysis, the convergence properties of the designed
algorithms are analytically investigated. It is shown that
the proposed seeking strategies would enable the players’
actions to converge to the Nash equilibrium under the given
conditions. Lastly, the proposed methods are applied for the
connectivity control of sensor networks.
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